Voices In Exile: the Rohingya, ASEAN, and the Collapse Of Regional Solidarity
Aung Kyaw Soe and Celia Vanessa Hakim
Rohingya people are the most oppressed and discriminated minorities in Myanmar where systematic segregation and terror by the state has been normalized for decades. Rohingya people, which are the Muslim populations in Arakan, have historically resided in the north Arakan (Rakhine) area since centuries ago and historical documents reveal the very existence of Rohingya in the region ever since the monarchical eras (Jacques Leider, 2013). The recognition and usage of the term “Rohingya” already existed during post-colonial Myanmar. This was supported by the official documents of the government and newspapers that prove the existence of Rohingya people in Myanmar, as well as their active participation in the civil society in post-colonial Myanmar. In relation to education, the state broadcasting service broadcasted Rohingya language section and there were also Rohingya student unions in University of Yangon in the 1950s. However, the ongoing military regimes since 1962 systematically planned the segregation policies against the minority ethnic groups, including Rohingya people. After Ne Win’s 1978 military operations and the 1982 Citizenship Law, the Rohingya were systematically expelled, with their identification documents revoked and their movement restricted for decades. These occurrences severed public awareness of the Rohingya, leading younger generations to believe they never existed as a result of deliberate propaganda.
Since the 2012 Rakhine riots, sparked by the Maungdaw incident, the term “Rohingya” has become widely used in news coverage concerning Myanmar. Simultaneously, a narrative emerged, claiming that “Rohingya do not exist, that they are illegal Bengalis from Bangladesh, and thus should be called Bengalis.” The narrative, accompanied by anti-Muslim hate speech and movements, led to violent attacks against Muslims, including the Meiktila riots. The state media and nationalist groups spread hate speech against the Rohingyas and created a narrative that Rohingyas (Bengalis as they called them) are the illegal migrants threatening national security.
The military “ethnic cleansing operation”, even before the end of 2016 and early 2017, forced nearly tens of thousands of Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2017). In August 2017, following the attack of Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, the Myanmar military’s ethnic clearance operation drove over 700,000 Rohingyas into Bangladesh (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2018), an exodus witnessed by the world. Reports indicate thousands of people were killed and hundreds of women were raped. The most undeniable fact is that Rohingya villages were burned to the ground, erasing all traces of their existence. Until 2025, displaced Rohingya refugees are still unable to go back to their homes where their rights to mobility, citizenship and mobility are violated, thus, making the Rohingya as the most vulnerable group with the intersection of oppression amongst the emerging political dynamics.
Given the concerning conditions of the Rohingya, they immigrated to several countries, particularly to Indonesia as a transit country (Nofli and Rona Puspita, 2024). From 2017 to 2023, the total number of Rohingya immigrants entering Indonesia has reached nearly 12.720 people (Khairul Rizqiah, et.al., 2024). In Indonesia, Rohingya refugees received proper facilities and gained solidarity with Indonesian Muslims. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) supported the government to provide humanitarian assistance like water, healthcare, COVID-19 testing, shelter materials and protection support (IOM, 2022). However, since they are “stateless”, they are not allowed to work, do not have access to education, and do not have any chance of obtaining Indonesian citizenship. Such circumstances lead the Rohingya refugees to feel that the provided hospitality is not enough (Middle East Institute, 2016). Because of their dissatisfaction, numbers of issues involving the Rohingya migrants, including sexual assault against minors at a shelther camp that violated the Islamic Law in Aceh. Several Rohingya refugees attempted to escape from refugee camps by climbing trees and walls. The Head of Public Relations of the Aceh Regional Police, Joko Krisdiyanto, also stated that the Rohingya groups had behaved poorly and did not comply with local community norms as they did not heed Islamic law and customs in the community (Muhammad Havez, 2024). Moreover, the arrival of the Rohingya refugees caused inflation in Aceh due to increasing demand for a number of commodities. For this reason, the Acehnese began to refuse to accept Rohingya refugees to stay in their land (Khairul Rizqiah, et.al., 2024).
To solve this issue means to bring social cohesion and harmony in the region to guarantee the peace amongst the natives and the Rohingya refugees. The most efficient way is to implement the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and its 1967 Protocol which form a core legal framework that defines the rights of refugees. Regarding the case in Aceh, the full implementation of the Article 17, 18, and 19 which clearly grants the rights to employment, self employment, and legal profession to lawful refugees, may be the best answer for peace and prosperity for the region as well as for the refugee communities. Unfortunately, among 10 member states of ASEAN, only Cambodia, the Philippines and Timor-Leste have ratified these conventions (UNHCR, 2025). Considering that Indonesia is not bound by the Refugee Convention, Indonesia does not have the obligation to adhere to these provisions. Nevertheless, the Indonesian government is still committed to facilitating fundamental needs to the refugees. One such example was when Indonesia kept in touch with international organizations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to ensure that the rights of the refugees were maintained. Although the Acehnese appears reluctant to accept more refugees, the Indonesian government has not forcibly returned them to Myanmar, which was in accordance with the customary international law of the non-refoulement principle (UNHCR, 2025). This approach reflects that the existence of the Rohingya refugees enables Indonesia’s compliance to international human rights law exposed to the international world despite not ratifying the Refugee Convention (Salle Salle, et.al., 2025). This indicates that basic human rights highly depend on the state’s willingness to comply with the provisions.
As one of the largest political and economic unions in the region, ASEAN has taken a distinct approach in tackling this issue. The existing principle of non-intervention and consensus-based decision-making hinders the ASEAN Member States from advocating other states’ domestic issues (Putri Mushfiya and Stanislaus Riyanta, 2024). These principles, while promoting regional harmony, restrict the association from intervening in domestic affairs. For instance, in April 2021, ASEAN leaders and Myanmar’s military chief agreed upon the Five-Point Consensus that aimed to end violence and facilitate humanitarian aid. However, Myanmar’s junta neglected the agreement, as evident in the expansion of abusive operations conducted by the military in ethnic minority areas (Human Rights Watch, 2022). While Indonesia and Malaysia have been vocal in criticizing Myanmar’s action, Singapore, on the other hand, declared that they will not interfere with Myanmar’s domestic politics (CNA, 2023). In the 2018 ASEAN Summit, the Head of State of ASEAN Members expressed their willingness to support Myanmar in its repatriation process through the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) (Alderin Joisafita Tangdialla, et. al., 2019). However, in practice, the AHA Centre failed to provide adequate humanitarian assistance to the population in need (Amnesty, 2023). While the ASEAN Member States have shown significant efforts, the Rohingya crisis remained an issue until today.
To conclude, the Rohingya issue is not merely a humanitarian crisis, but it is also a litmus test for ASEAN’s credibility in promoting human rights and regional stability. In light of this challenge, it is imperative for ASEAN to critically reassess its non-intervention principle, as it should not be a shield for member states to avoid responsibility while civilians suffer. The writers argue that even if the non-intervention principle does not exist and other ASEAN Member States help to facilitate the Rohingya groups, all of those efforts mean nothing without a genuine commitment from Myanmar to dismantle its discriminatory policy. As long as the Rohingya continue to face systematic mistreatment by their own government, they will remain as a highly vulnerable population. Therefore, as part of the international community, the authors believe that an intense advocacy and negotiation with the Myanmar government is crucially needed in order to promote international human rights.
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